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ABSTRACT 
 
By the official opening of ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in 2015, it will 
bring a tremendous impact on transnational business operations. There will be many 
of business transactions arise which might lead many conflicts across different 
countries. The ASEAN integration and mutual comprehension through law project are 
essential. It is necessary for the ASEAN members to remove uncertainty and create 
more formal ASEAN Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM). Due to the increase of 
economic disputes, ASEAN acknowledged the necessity to establish the dispute 
settlement agreement which covered to the economic disputes by giving a 
consistency of procedure, predictable of outcomes, precise adoption of the ruling, 
and the sanctions of non-compliance to the rulings.  
This paper will focus on the main legal framework of the 2004 Protocol for 
Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism (EDSM) or known as the Vientiane Protocol 
and Protocol to the ASEAN Charter Dispute Settlement Mechanism in 2010 (PDSM). 
The ASEAN DSM has been formed for more than 10 years, but the systems have never 
been utilizing the process. Thus, it can imply that the mechanisms may contain some 
problems and weaknesses.  
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บทคัดยอ 
 
ในปจจุบันนั้นประเทศสมาชิกอาเซียนกําลังเดินหนาเขาสูการเปนประชาคมเศรษฐกิจ
อาเซียนในป พ.ศ. 2558 (ค.ศ. 2015) ซ่ึงเปนการสนับสนุนการคาและการลงทุนระหวางประเทศ
สมาชิก แตในทางกลับกันนั้นโอกาสทางเศรษฐกิจอาจมีการแปรเปลี่ยนเปนขอพิพาททางเศรษฐกิจ
ระหวางประเทศสมาชิกได ถึงแมวาอาเซียนจะไดมีบทบัญญัติท่ีกําหนดถึงวิธีการระงับขอพิพาทดาน
เศรษฐกิจโดยสันติวิธีไวโดยเฉพาะใน “พิธีสารวาดวยกลไกระงับขอพิพาทของอาเซียน (ASEAN 
Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism – EDSM )” ซ่ึงใชกลไกการระงับ  
ขอพิพาทของ องคการการคาโลก (WTO) เปนตนแบบนั้น โดยบทบัญญัติดังกลาวไดมีข้ึนมาเกือบ
ระยะเวลาสิบป แตตราบจนกระท่ังบัดนี้ก็ยังไมเคยมีประเทศสมาชิกคูพิพาท ใดเลือกใชกระบวนการ
ระงับขอพิพาทตามพิธีสารฯ ดังกลาวเลย ผูวิจัยจึงสนใจท่ีจะทําการศึกษาถึงจุดออนของบทบัญญัติ
ดังกลาว ซ่ึงนําไปสูบทสรุปและขอเสนอแนะของผูวิจัยและสามารถใชเปนแนวทางในการวางแผน
นโยบายรัฐและมุงพัฒนากฎหมายภายในของประเทศสมาชิกใหสอดคลองกับเจตนารมณของ
ประชาคมเศรษฐกิจอาเซียนตอไป   
 
คําหลัก : การระงับขอพิพาททางเศรษฐกิจของอาเซียน ขอพิพาททางเศรษฐกิจของอาเซียน 
 
1.  Introduction 
  The dispute among the ASEAN can be divided into: economic dispute and, 
non-economic dispute After ASEAN has inspired the economic integration by using 
AFTA, both the trading and disputes have been increased across the ASEAN regions. 
But during that period of time, ASEAN has got only the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) as the only one instrument of ASEAN DSM. In 
1976, ASEAN had adopted TAC at Bali Summit which is appropriate for settling the 
non-economic dispute. Under article 2 of the TAC, the key provision of TAC stipulated 
that the member states should refrain from the threat or use of force and settle any 
disputes through friendly negotiations (Treaty of Amitis and Cooperation, Article 2). 
Therefore, it can be said that TAC is a landmark agreement which allows the 
signatories to settle disputes peacefully through consultation. TAC is used to resolve 
the disputes that do not involve the interpretation or application of any ASEAN 
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instrument (ASEAN Charter, Article 24 (2)). The dispute mechanism of TAC consists of 
the high council which comprised of the ministerial representatives of all high 
contracting parties that are members from the ten ASEAN countries (Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation Article 14). The High Council will handle with the disputes or 
situations that likely to disturb the regional peace and harmony (TAC, Article 14).   If 
the negotiation does not succeed in the settling the dispute, the High Council shall 
recommend appropriate means of dispute settlement (Treaty of Amities of 
Cooperation, Article 15). If both parties agreed, the high council may constitute itself 
as a committee of mediation, inquiry or conciliation. However, the weakness of TAC 
was the absence of clearly procedure and provision that require the disputing parties 
to respect decision, implement it, or adopt the sanction for non-compliance. 
Therefore, TAC is not the right answer for ASEAN to settle down the economic disputes 
due to the non-mandatory nature of procedures and no explicit provision for 
arbitration or adjudication by the tribunal. 
Afterwards, an early agreement for amicable settlement of economic disputes 
can be found in the 1987 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments 
(Koesnaidi, Shalmont, Fransisca and Sahari, 2004). It specified that the unresolved 
disputes shall be submitted to the ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM) for resolution. In 
November 1996, ASEAN established the Protocol for Dispute Settlement Mechanism. 
Like the WTO DSU, it encouraged the parties to settle the dispute amicably by using 
good offices, conciliation, and mediation. However, the Protocol for DSM in 1996 had 
failed to serve as an effective tool in settling dispute among the member states 
because it did not set up a group of experienced professionals to serve as appellate 
body but authorizes the AEM to serve as appellate body. Thus, it disturbed to the 
transparency of the mechanism which question to be overwhelmed by the political 
power. Later on, the 1996 protocol has been replaced by the 2004 Protocol for 
Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism (EDSM) or known as the Vientiane Protocol. 
The EDSM 2004 has adopted as an annex of the Bali Concord II. It ensures the 
implementation of economic agreements and speedy resolution to the economic 
disputes. The major improvement of EDSM from 1996 to 2004 is the clearly detail of 
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procedure in each stage, the significant improvement of Appellate Body which provide 
more transparency to the mechanism and also guarantee the binding enforcement 
among the parties. By all of the new improvements, the model of EDSM becomes 
more legalistic and effective to support for the resolution to the disputes.  
However, surprisingly no dispute has been resolved by EDSM panel. The 
members were hesitating to use ASEAN EDSM due to the lack of confidence and 
unpredictable of the system. The absence using of ASEAN DSM can imply that there 
might be some loopholes in the system that waiting for the improvement. ASEAN DSM 
should not be only a model in the paper. Therefore, it is necessary for ASEAN to 
improve DSM in order to smoothly implement the economic agreements and gain the 
trust from all of the ASEAN members.  
 
2.  Dispute Resolution Mechanism under the Bali Concord II 
  Under the Bangkok Declaration, ASEAN have agreed to establish the three-
pillars, the ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC), the ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC), and the ASEAN Socio-cultural Community (ASCC). Among the three 
pillars, the economic pillar is the most advanced cooperation. ASEAN endeavors with 
their best effort to create a single market and production base in 2015 by forming AEC 
project (Woon SC and Marshall, 2012). The objective is to achieve the economic and 
trade liberalization. ASEAN agreed to form the AEC by the 2020 which later the 
timeframe has been changed into 2015. The aim of AEC is to enhance a free flow of 
goods, services, labors, investment and capital will help boosting up the ASEAN 
economy and investments (Understanding the ASEAN, 2016). By the official opening 
of AEC, it is necessary for ASEAN to prepare the appropriate ASEAN DSM which directly 
covers to the economic disputes. The economic integration will not be successful 
without the obedience and explicit of interpretation and implementation of the 
various economic agreements. Therefore, the establishment of such DSM was one of 
the important tasks of ASEAN.  
  On 7 October 2003, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II has adopted at the 
9th ASEAN Summit in Bali. ASEAN states undertook to implement the 
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recommendations of the High Level Task Force on ASEAN Economic Integration 
(Vergano, 2009). The formal system of DSM provided in Annex 1 of ASEAN Concord II, 
the DSM consisted of 3 instruments: including the ASEAN Consultation to Solve Trade 
and Investment Issues (ACT), ASEAN Compliance Monitoring Body (ACMB), and 
Enhanced ASEAN Dispute Settlement Mechanism (EDSM). The resolution of disputes 
range from the advisory stage to the consultative stage, and finally the adjudication 
stage; however, this is not mandatory. In other words, Member States or parties to the 
dispute may choose the appropriate stage for the resolution of their dispute (Nimnual, 
2010). 
  The Protocol for Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism (EDSM) 2004, or 
known as the Vientiane Protocol, has adopted as one of the annex in Bali Concord II. 
It ensures the implementation of economic agreements and speedy resolution to the 
economic disputes. The major improvement of EDSM from 1996 to 2004 is the clearly 
detail of procedure in each stage, the significant improvement of Appellate Body 
which provide more transparency to the mechanism and also guarantee the binding 
enforcement among the parties. By all of the new improvements, the model of EDSM 
becomes more legalistic and effective to support for the resolution to the disputes. 
The Bali Concord will separate into three sections: ACT, ACMB, EDSM panel.  
  2.1  ACT in Advisory Mechanism 
   In advisory mechanisms, it includes the ASEAN Consultation to Solve 
Trade and Investment Issues (ACT) and the ASEAN Legal Unit. The ACT offers the 
speedy legal interpretation and advice on potential trade dispute issues upon request 
from Member States. It is responsible for directing the problem to the appropriate 
government agencies in its country, and ensuring that a proposed solution is sent to 
the individuals/businesses via the Host ACT within 30 calendar days (Annex 1 ASEAN 
Consultation Issues 3). At this stage, it will guarantee to avoid the delays in resolving 
the disputes. For the non-compliance, the disputes will be sent to the next level of 
ACMB to resolve the dispute. 
   The legal unit consisted of qualified lawyers specializing in trade laws 
which employed by the ASEAN Secretariat. The unit will offer legal interpretation and 
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advice on potential trade dispute issues upon request from countries (Annex 1 ASEAN 
Legal Unit (2)). The advice is purely advisory and non-binding in nature. Its role is to 
screen out the issues that could be resolved through bilateral consultations. 
  2.2  ACMB in Consultative Mechanism 
   In consultative mechanisms, it includes the ASEAN Compliance Monitoring 
Body (ACMB) and conciliation or mediation instruments. The process will run by ASEAN 
Compliance Board (ACB). The AEM had directed SEOM to work out a Terms of 
Reference for this monitoring body (Annex 1 ASEAN Compliance Monitoring (4)). 
   The ACMB is kind of a peer adjudication, which is less legalistic and offers 
a speedier channel, to help countries resolve their disputes. Upon the request, the 
ACMB members that are not involved in the dispute will review and issue findings on 
the case within a stipulated timeframe (Nimnual, 2012, pp. 175). The case findings of 
the ACB are not legally-binding (Annex 1 ASEAN Compliance Monitoring (2)). Subject 
to agreement by both Parties, Member Countries who do not wish to avail of the 
ACMB after going through the ACT can go directly to the ASEAN EDSM panel (Annex 1 
ASEAN Compliance Monitoring (3)). 
  2.3  EDSM in Enforcement Mechanisms 
   This stage includes the Enhanced ASEAN Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
(EDSM).The EDSM would be modeled after the WTO DSU in resolving the trade 
disputes. It ensures the binding decisions which based solely on legal considerations 
in order to depoliticize the entire process (Annex 1 Enhanced ASEAN DSM (2)). The 
detail of the entire process of EDSM will be explained deeply below here 
2.3.1 The Procedure of EDSM  
    A. Consultation 
     In article 3 of EDSM, the compulsory first step of the process 
should begin with writing consultations which indicates the legal basis for the 
complaint. Then, SEOM will notify the request submission for consultation. Member 
States who have any benefit directly or indirectly can make representations or 
proposals to the other Member State concerned. The representations or proposals 
shall be given to consideration. Then, the other party must reply within 10 days after 
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the date of receipt of the request and shall enter into consultations within a period 
of 30 days after the date of receipt of the request. The protocol permits the parties 
to the dispute may at any time to agree or terminate the three other mechanisms 
which are good offices, conciliation and mediation depending on the request of the 
party. 
     In article 4 of EDSM, once procedures for good offices, 
conciliation or mediation are terminated, a complaining party may then proceed with 
a request to the SEOM for the establishment of a panel. 
    B. Panel Process 
     In article 5 of EDSM, it stipulates that the panel shall be 
established by the SEOM, unless the SEOM decides by consensus not to establish a 
panel. If the consultations failed, the complainant may raise the dispute to the Senior 
Economic Official Meeting (SEOM) within 45 days after the receipt of the request and 
circulation. 
     The panel shall compose of three or five panelists depending 
on the agreement of the parties. According to Appendix II of the Protocol, it stipulated 
the selection of those who are qualified to become members of the panel must have 
these following qualifications:  
     1. Well-qualified governmental and/or nongovernmental individuals 
     2. Legal professionals or academics in the field of international 
trade law and ASEAN economic agreements. 
     ASEAN secretariat is responsible for listing the qualified 
individuals which members of a panel may be drawn. The list shall indicate the 
specific experience or expertise. 
     The function of the panel is to make an objective assessment of 
the dispute before it, examine the facts of the case and conform to the sections of 
the Agreement or any covered agreements, and rule out the findings and 
recommendations in relation to the case (ASEAN Protocol Article 7). The panel shall 
submit its findings and recommendations to the SEOM in the form of a written report 
within 60 days of its establishment (EDSM Article 8). Moreover, before submitting the 
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findings and recommendations to the SEOM, the panel shall equally provide 
opportunity to the parties to the dispute to review the report. A panel shall have the 
right to seek information and technical advice from any appropriate individual or body. 
The panel deliberation s shall meet in closed session and shall be kept confidential. 
SEOM must adopt the report within 30 days unless there is a consensus not to do so 
or a party notifies its decision to appeal (ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism Article 9.1). A non-reply shall be considered as accepting the 
decision into the panel report. The findings and recommendations of panel should 
be adopted within 60 days of its establishment in order to ensure the effective 
resolution of disputes (EDSM Article If the party asks for the time extension to conform 
to its obligation, SEOM should give a decision within 14 days from the SEOM’s 
adoption of the findings and recommendations of the Appellate Body’s reports (EDSM 
Article 8 (2), 15 (1)). 
     Before the first meeting of the panel, the parties to the dispute 
shall submit the written submissions to the panel (EDSM App II, Article II (4)). During 
the first meeting, the panel shall ask the complaining party to present its case (EDSM 
App II Article II (5)). The third parties who related with the interest of the dispute shall 
be invited to present its case in writing in the first meeting (EDSM App II, Article II (6)). 
The parties shall have the right to submit the rebuttals to the panel in the first 
meetings but the formal rebuttals shall be made at a second meeting of the panel 
(EDSM App II, Article II (7)). Any member state who has a substantial interest shall 
notify to the panel in written submissions before transferring to SEOM (EDSM, Article 
11 (2)). 
    C. Appellate Review 
     An appellate body established by the ASEAN Economic Ministers 
(“AEM”). It shall be composed of 7 people, 3 of whom shall serve on any one case 
(ASEAN Protocol, Article 12.1). The AEM shall appoint person to serve on the Appellate 
Body for a four-year term, and the term may renew once (EDSM, Article 12 (2)). The 
requirement of the appellate body shall consist of individuals of recognized with 
demonstrated expertise in international trade law and the subject matter to the 
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covered agreements (EDSM, Article 12 (3)).  And they shall not participate in the 
consideration of any disputes that would create a direct or indirect conflict of interest 
(EDSM, Article 12 (3)). 
     Only parties to a dispute can appeal a panel report (EDSM, 
Article 12 (4)). An appellate body will decide the panel’s report within 60 days after 
the appeal request was filed but an appeal must not exceed within 90 days (EDSM, 
Article 12 (5)).  Appeals are limited to issues of law and interpretation which means 
the Appellate Body should not made their assessment based on the facts (Koesnaidi 
et al. (2014)). The proceedings of the Appellate Body shall be confidential (EDSM, 
Article 12 (9)). The Appellate Body may uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings 
and conclusions of the panel (EDSM, Article 12 (12)). The Appellate Body report shall 
be adopted by SEOM within 30 days following its circulation to the Member States, 
unless SEOM decided by the consensus not to do so (EDSM, Article 12 (13)). A non-
reply, within 30 days after the report has been adopted, shall be considered as an 
acceptance of the Appellate Body report. The adoption process shall be completed 
within 30 days irrespective of whether it is settled at the SEOM or by circulation.  The 
disputing parties should accept the report and comply within 60 days; otherwise SEOM 
has the right to impose sanctions (EDSM, Article 16 (2)).  However, the parties shall 
have the right to request for the longer timeframe for implementation the report of 
the Appellate Body. The decision of the time extension shall be made within 14 days 
from the SEOM’s adoption of the Appellate Body’s reports (EDSM, Article 15 (3)). 
     In EDSM, it also stipulated the remedy in case the non-
implementation of the findings and recommendations of panel and Appellate Body 
reports. When neither compensation nor the suspension of concessions or other 
obligations which provided by SEOM fails to resolve the issues within 60 days or within 
the period agreed by the party, the concerned party may trigger the process of 
compensation and the suspension of concessions (EDSM, Article 16).  The process 
under this article 16 of EDSM is similar to WTO DSU. 
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3. Protocol to the ASEAN Charter Dispute Settlement Mechanism in 
2010 (PDSM) 
  3.1  Protocol to the ASEAN Charter Dispute Settlement Mechanism in 
2010 (PDSM) 
   The post stage of EDSM: the DSM through the ASEAN Charter 
   According to the article 25 of ASEAN Charter, it permitted the arbitration 
process to be counted as an appropriate DSM concerning on the interpretation or 
application of this Charter and other ASEAN instruments. If the dispute remains 
unresolved after recourse to such mechanisms, it can be referred to the ASEAN 
Summit for the ASEAN Leaders’ decision (PDSM, Article 26). However, there are no 
guidelines for the ASEAN Summit to react or decide on non-compliance circumstance 
in order to impose a form of sanction on non-compliance. 
   In order to implement Article 25 of the Charter, ASEAN adopted the 2010 
Protocol to portray an explicit details and procedures (2010 Protocol). Repeating 
Article 25 of the ASEAN Charter, Article 2 (1) of the 2010 Protocol stipulated its 
application to: (PDSM 2010, Article 2 (1)). 
   A. the ASEAN Charter;  
   B.  other ASEAN instruments unless specific means of settling such 
disputes have already been provided for;  
   C.  other ASEAN instruments which expressly provide that this Protocol or 
part of this Protocol shall apply. 
   Any disputes relating to this convention can be settled by the 2010 PDSM. 
3.2  The Procedure of PDSM 
   A. Consultation 
    The first step is a request for consultation to the responding party; a 
party should reply the request within 30 days and must enter into the consultation. 
The consultation must be completed with a view to reaching a mutually agreed 
solution’ within sixty days from the date of receipt of the request (PDSM 2010, Article 
2 (1)). If the party did not respond within 30 days or the consultation fails within 90 
days from the date of receipt of the consultation request, then the complaining party 
37  
Assumption University Law Journal                  วารสารนิติศาสตร มหาวทิยาลัยอัสสัมชัญ 
Vol. 7 No. 2 (July - December 2016) ปที่ 7 ฉบับที ่2 (กรกฎาคม – ธันวาคม 2559) 
Article  Natthada Termudomchai 
may request the establishment of an arbitral tribunal (PDSM 2010, Article 8 (1)). As a 
general principle of ASEAN DSM, it can be concluded that the parties to the disputes 
should firstly hold the consultation before employing any legally binding DSM (Hao 
Duy Phan, 2013, p. 13).  
   B. Good offices, Mediation, and Conciliation 
    Once the arbitration request is made, the responding party has 15 days 
to positively respond to the complaining party; otherwise the complaining party may 
refer the dispute to the ASEAN Coordinating Council (ACC) (ASEAN Charter, article 8 
(4)) which comprising the foreign ministers of all ten member states (ASEAN Charter, 
article 8 (4)). 
    The member states may request the appointment of arbitral tribunal 
(ASEAN Charter, article 8 (1)). An arbitration, which should be done in writing, can be 
formed by the mutual consent of the Parties to the dispute or a direction of the ACC 
(ASEAN Charter, article 20). The arbitral tribunal shall consist of three arbitrators 
(ASEAN Charter, Annex 4, rule 1 (1)). The arbitrators shall have expertise or experience 
in law, other matters covered by the ASEAN Charter or the relevant ASEAN instrument, 
or the resolution of disputes arising under international agreements (ASEAN Charter, 
article 11). The Chair of the arbitral tribunal shall be a national of a Member State but 
not a national of any Party to the dispute. An arbitral tribunal shall make an 
examination of the facts of the case before it, and decide the case providing the 
reasons for its rulings (ASEAN Charter, article 12).  
    Then, ACC has 45 days to directly make a decision by choosing any of 
the DSM including mediation, conciliation or arbitration that is appropriate to settle 
down the disputes. During the whole process, the parties to a dispute may also at any 
time agree to go through good offices, mediation or conciliation to resolve their 
disagreements (ASEAN Charter, article 6-7). When parties to the dispute receive a 
direction from the ACC, they are expected to comply with the ACC decision. 
    Once the disputes have been resolved by the good offices, it shall 
submit to the ASEAN Chairman or the ASEAN Secretary-General or a suitable person 
to provide good offices (ASEAN Charter, annex 1, rule 1 (2)). The concerned parties 
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may request the ASEAN Chairman or the ASEAN Secretary-General to provide good 
offices, conciliation or mediation (ASEAN Charter, article 23 (2)). They may also choose 
mediators, conciliators, or arbitrators from the list drawn up and maintained by the 
ASEAN Secretary-General (PDSM, annex 4, rule 5 (1)). By comparing with Article 4(3) of 
the EDSM, the ASEAN Secretary-General itself may offer to provide good offices, 
conciliation or mediation with a view to assisting the parties to settle their dispute. 
However, there is a concern on PDSM that the proactive of ASEAN Chairman and 
Secretary-General to offer good offices, conciliation or mediation without having to be 
requested from the disputed parties, this will be too interfering into the disputes. 
Consequently, it was ultimately decided that it would be better to let the concerned 
parties make the request by themselves rather than allow outside actors to actively 
attempt to get involved (Woon, 2009). The person providing good offices should be 
independent, neutral, impartial manner (PDSM, annex 1, r. 1 (2), 2) and enable this 
person to carry out his or her responsibilities (PDSM, annex 1, r. 1 (2)).   
    A mediator shall have a quite similar role. He or she may communicate 
with the parties together or separately and help to resolve the disputes which can be 
done in both orally or in writing (PDSM, annex 2, rule 4)  Parties to the dispute shall 
comply with the decision and agreements resulting from good offices, mediation and 
conciliation (PDSM, Article 16). 
    By Compared with good offices or the mediator, conciliators are 
commonly used. They shall be in good faith to comply with the requests by 
conciliators to submit written materials, provide evidence or attend meetings (PDSM, 
annex 2, Rules 8). Additionally, conciliators may formulate the appropriate settlement 
to the parties or may assist the parties in drafting the settlement agreement (PDSM, 
annex 3, Rule 10).  If one or both of the parties terminate the process, the good 
offices, mediation or conciliation shall end. Also, they shall be ceased when the 
disputes have been resolved (PDSM, Article 7 (2)-(3)). 
   C. Arbitration 
    The arbitral tribunal is composed of 3 arbitrators (PDSM, annex 4, Rules 
1(1)). Each party has the right to appoint one arbitrator. If one party failed to appoint 
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the arbitrators, the ASEAN Secretary-General shall appoint the second arbitrator, who 
is in the list that may serve as arbitrators, within 15 days from the date receiving the 
request (PDSM, annex 4, Rules 1(3)). The arbitrator lists should be comprised by the 
10 nominations from every ASEAN member states. The third arbitrator shall be 
appointed upon agreement by the parties (PDSM, annex 4, r. 1 (4), a).  If the parties 
fail to do so, any party may request the ACC Chair to appoint the third arbitrator who 
shall be the chair of the arbitral tribunal (PDSM, annex 4, r. 1 (4)(b) and (c)).  Another 
key point is the way PDSM use to limit the power of Secretary-general, when ASEAN 
Secretary-General appoint the second arbitrator, he or she shall not has the authority 
to appoint the third one. Secretary-General shall only submit the recommendation to 
the ACC, and then the decision shall be made by the consensus. In order to maintain 
the fairness, if the ACC Chair is a national of one of the parties to the dispute, the 
appointment of the third arbitrator shall be made by the next ACC Chair who is not a 
national of one of the parties to the dispute (PDSM, annex 4, r. 1 (4) (e)).  As required 
by the DSMP, arbitrators shall possess expertise or experience in law and in the 
matters covered by the ASEAN Charter or the relevant ASEAN instrument (PDSM, 
article 11 (2)). 
    The Chair of the arbitral tribunal shall not be a national of the parties 
(PDSM, Article 11 (3)). Parties to the dispute may challenge an arbitrator, if they doubt 
in his or her impartiality or independence (PDSM, annex 4, r. 2 (2)). 
    The award of the arbitral tribunal shall be final and binding on the 
Parties to the dispute (PDSM, Article 15).  It shall be reached by a majority vote of the 
arbitrators (PDSM, annex 4, rule 14). In cases of no majority, the chair of the tribunal 
shall have a casting vote. The arbitral tribunal shall fix the timetable for the arbitral 
proceedings within 15 days or as soon as possible from the date of its establishment. 
From the date of the establishment of the arbitral tribunal until the date of the final 
award, the arbitral proceedings shall not exceed the period of six months unless the 
Parties to the dispute agree otherwise (PDSM, Annex 4, rule 8). The award of the 
arbitral tribunal shall be made in writing and reasonable confined to the subject-
matter of the dispute (PDSM, annex 4, rule 17). 
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    After all, it can be concluded that arbitration is a formal dispute 
resolution with legal binding force, however the good offices, mediation or conciliation 
are voluntary mechanisms which sometimes have no-binding force (Hao Duy Phan, 
2013, p. 15). 
    The PDSM aims to handle with those disputes which arising from 
divergent interpretation and application of the ASEAN Charter and other ASEAN 
instruments. The disputes often related with the political, social and cultural sensitive 
issues within ASEAN. As a matter of fact, ASEAN has never had arbitration as a mode 
of DSM before, except in the EDSM where arbitration is only provided in cases of 
disputes concerning compensation and suspension of concessions (ASEAN Charter, 
article 15). Although the ASEAN Charter did not set up the courts of justice like other 
organizations, but it offered a venue for ASEAN to pursue in case they have disputes 
concerning the interpretation and application in the ASEAN Charter (Hao Duy Phan, 
2013, p. 7). This is a big step way forward of ASEAN DSM. 
 
4. The Ineffective of ASEAN DSM regarding to the Economic Disputes 
  ASEAN has stipulated the way to settle down the economic disputes in both 
EDSM and ASEAN Charter. By the rapid emerging of trading and economic investment, 
the concern of ASEAN that the EDSM and PDSM may not cover to all of the complexity 
in economic conflicts. The main issue to be focused in this paper was the ineffective 
of ASEAN DSM to settle down the economic disputes.  
  After observing through the details of ASEAN EDSM and PDSM, there are some 
points that ASEAN need to be improved and aware of in order to fill in the loopholes 
of the system. Currently, the mechanism has never been utilized by any of ASEAN 
member states. The problems that affected the confidence of the system are 
mentioned below here. 
  4.1  Legal uncertainty due to the ASEAN way and the consensus from the 
ASEAN Summit  
   After studying ASEAN DSM, I discovered that ASEAN Charter and ASEAN 
way have a big impact over ASEAN community. The Charter has been placing as the 
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constitution of community. The aim of the charter is to bolster and motivate the 
ASEAN economic goal and institutional framework. It established ASEAN as an inter-
governmental organization which gradually mold ASEAN as a strong community. 
ASEAN has used ASEAN Charter and the norms of ASEAN way in driving their 
cooperation and integration amongst the community.  
   ASEAN has been dominated by the ASEAN way, a non-confrontation 
negotiable way of ASEAN. The purpose is based on the principle of respect sovereignty 
by not interfering in the internal affairs of ASEAN member states (Altbach, 1998). It has 
a big influence over the ASEAN community. It is the special characteristics of non-
confrontation negotiable way of ASEAN to avoid conflicts during the economic 
integration or conducting the policies. ASEAN mostly operate their policies relying 
more on diplomacy rather than law. Following the "ASEAN way", decision-making is 
based on musyawarah (consultation) and muafakat (consensus) (Nimnual, 2010, p. 
159). The decision-making among the ASEAN member states shall be conducted by 
the “consensus” at the Summit official meeting not by the majority votes, meanwhile, 
it needed to respect the sovereignty of the state-member. In order to reach the 
consensus, all of the members need to agree with that policy or decision-making. 
ASEAN is aware of the sensitive issues, likes boundaries conflicts or political conflicts, 
which might lead to the quarrels. Therefore, amicably negotiation is important in order 
to sustain a friendly relationship among the members.  At the same time, it needs to 
respect the sovereignty of the ASEAN member states by not interfere in domestic 
affairs of the others.  
   By referring the interview of Dr. Thanes Sujareekul from the LL.M. thesis 
of Ms. Puthachart Boonklom, (Puthachart, 2017, pp. 68-69) he suggested that ASEAN 
way has pros and cons. Every ASEAN’s decision-making or policy should be discussed 
and agreed by the consensus. If there is any disagreement from any member, the 
decision will be failed and postponed out until receiving the consensus from all the 
members. Even though this action supports the ASEAN way by respecting the 
sovereignty of ASEAN member states, but the issue keeps dragging and cannot be 
solved in time.   
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   From the WTO, the general principle of effective dispute settlement 
mechanism should compose with 4 principles: Equitable, fast, effective, and mutually 
accepted. 
   1. Equitable – the neutrality can create the confidence among the ASEAN 
member state. Moreover, the legal experts, who have high experienced in that 
substantial law and should be without prejudice and the interest related to the case, 
will strengthen the credibility of the process. The DSM should be transparent and 
revealed from the beginning of the process until the end as well as the enforcement 
of the decision should be speedy and fair. 
   2. Fast – The effective compliance of DSM has to be done quickly as soon 
as possible. If the trade dispute resolution process is delayed, it will affect to the 
business operations and investors which will hesitate with the confidence of the 
dispute resolution process.   
   3. Effective – The decision should be enforced and applicable to the 
circumstances in order to settle down the disputes. 
   4. Mutual accepted- Under the conditions of international law, the 
dispute settlement should mutually accepted from both parties and applicable to 
the case under any circumstances.  
   From the observation, no evidence can prove that the summit will use 
these principles as a standard fundamental in making a consensus. Thus, the 
transparency of ASEAN’s decision-making has been questioned, since there is no 
procedure to control or limit the power of the ASEAN Summit. This affected to the 
certainty and confidence of ASEAN DSM that it might be interfered by political pressure 
or peer pressure among the ASEAN member states. 
   A. For EDSM at SEOM, the panel stage and the appellate stage 
    Under Article 5(1) of EDSM stipulated that SEOM shall reject a panel or 
Appellate body, unless the consensus not to establish a panel (EDSM, article 5(1)). 
From this, the consensus can influence on the SEOM’s decision to establish the panel 
or the appellate body. Moreover, in the panel stage, in article 9(1) of EDSM, the panel 
shall adopt its report within 30 days except a party to the dispute notifies the SEOM 
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to appeal the report or SEOM decides by consensus not to adopt the report (EDSM, 
article 9(1)). And the same procedure also applied to the Appellate stage too. In Article 
12(13) of EDSM, an Appellate Body report shall be adopted by the SEOM within 30 
days. The parties shall unconditionally accept unless the SEOM decides by consensus 
not to adopt the Appellate Body report (EDSM, article 12(13)). 
    SEOM is the powerful board formed to administer the entire EDSM 
procedure. It has the authority to adopt the panel reports and Appellate reports, 
supervise the implementation of the ruling, and enforce the retaliation when a 
member does not comply with the ruling. However, the power of SEOM has limited 
by the consensus, it can overturn the SEOM’s decision. In contrast, there is no clear 
procedure for Summit to solve out the resolution by the consensus. It is likely that 
the ASEAN’s consensus will be overshadowed by the political power from the Summit. 
ASEAN should aware that the Summit will not act as a final arbitrator and the dispute 
shall be decided on a case-by-case basis depending on the submission and evidence 
at the time.  
   B. For PDSM 2010 
    For unresolved disputes 
    According to the Rules for Reference of Unresolved Disputes to the 
ASEAN Summit, it has to seek consultation first; then it has to try good offices, 
mediation, or arbitration and go to the ACC to look for direction. Only after these 
mechanisms fail, then it can be referred as the unresolved dispute and submit to the 
ASEAN Summit. In article 26 of ASEAN Charter, it stipulated that if the concerned 
parties fail to resolve the disputes, the disputes shall be referred to the ASEAN Summit 
for its decision.  
    Before an unresolved dispute can reach the ASEAN Summit, it has to 
go through the ACC (EDSM, annex 5, rule 2). The ACC has the power to give another 
chance to the parties without having to go to the ASEAN Summit. The ACC cannot 
““direct” but can only “consider suggesting, recommending or providing assistance, 
as appropriate, to the Parties to the dispute to resolve the dispute through some 
other dispute settlement mechanisms provided for under this Protocol.”(EDSM, annex 
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5, rule 3(2)). When the unresolved disputes have reached the ASEAN Summit, the 
consensus will be decide by using the submission from the disputing parties, the 
report and recommendations from the ACC (PDSM, supra note 7, annex 5, rule 4(3)). 
At this stage, ACC may recommend to invite the experts to the ASEAN Summit for the 
resolution of the unresolved disputes (PDSM, supra note 7, annex 5, rule 4 (3)). 
    The unresolved disputes can be withdrawn from ASEAN Summit only 
when the dispute has already been resolved or both parties agreed to resolve in 
another way. Regarding to the final resolution giving by the ASEAN Summit, there was 
a concern that the disputes will be resolved through the political solution instead of 
focusing on rule-of-law. For non-compliance 
    Before submitting to the ASEAN Summit, the matter has to be 
considered by the ACC. In this regard, the ACC potentially has an active role to play 
in helping concerned parties to find a way to comply with arbitral awards or 
settlement agreements before having the instance of non-compliance referred to the 
ASEAN Summit (Hao Duy Phan, 2013). In some cases, if the party aggrieved by non-
compliance, ACC can provide the assistance by conducting the consultation among 
the parties in order to facilitate and accomplish the compliance (PDSM, article 20, 
annes 6, rule 3 (a)). However, if the disputing parties satisfied with the consultation 
outcome, it may withdraw the reference from the ASEAN Summit (PDSM, article 20, 
annex 6, rule 4). 
    By referring the non-compliance to the ASEAN Summit for the 
consensus, under the article 27 of ASEAN Charter, ACC shall submit a report described 
the information of the cases and actions to be taken or recommendations on any 
measures to ensure the compliance (PDSM, article 20, annex 6, rule 5 (b) (v)). After 
the reference has reached the ASEAN Summit, it will provide the decision-making by 
the consensus which will not be able to enforce any strong actions against the non-
complaint state (Hao Duy Phan, 2013, p. 28). It should be noted that ASEAN Summit 
can contribute only peer pressure pointing to the concerned parties that are not 
following the compliance or agreements. ASEAN Summit cannot do much except 
encouraging the concerned parties to comply with the decision and further update 
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the ASEAN Summit on the compliance matter (Hao Duy Phan, 2013, p. 28). Therefore, 
it is likely that the non-compliance issue will not be resolved on time. 
    Lastly, ASEAN should bear in mind that the Summit will not serve as 
an “ASEAN Supreme Court”. The Summit should act as the policy-maker of the ASEAN 
by depending on a consensus basis. Thus, the key point of bringing the unresolved 
disputes to the ASEAN Summit would simply to express their concerns and then to 
recommend, urge or call upon the concerned parties to resolve the dispute by other 
peaceful means (Hao Duy Phan, 2013, p. 25). 
 
  4.2 Limiting the power of EDSM not to invalidate the existing 
domestic laws and creating new law (Kooi, 2007, pp. 10-13) 
   By comparing to the European community (EC), a centralized 
supranational legal organization, it has developed new approaches and combined 
models (Nakamura, 2009, p. 135). The European Court of Justice (ECJ), based in 
Luxembourg, is assigned to consider disputes between member states of the 
European Union; between the European Union and member states; between the 
institutions within the European Union; between individuals, or corporate bodies, and 
the European Union (Thailand Journal of Law and policy, 2016). It may deliver opinions 
on international agreements and give preliminary rulings on cases referred by national 
courts. Moreover, it appeared that ECJ allows itself to be involved in the national 
caseload for the development of community law (Davies, 2007, p. 183). The ECJ has 
developed the concepts of direct effect and supremacy. Direct effect may be defined 
as the capacity of a domestic court to apply EC law, (Weiler, 1991) while supremacy 
refers to a court’s ability to overrule domestic law on the basis of its incompatibility 
with EC law (De Witte, 1999). The establishment of these two principles meant that 
the EC agreements shall apply directly within member states’ legal systems and any 
domestic law found to be inconsistent with an agreement could be considered as 
invalid (Sander, 2006). Through the application of direct effect and supremacy, EC law 
is used to invalidate domestic law of member states, also limiting the power of 
member states not to violate the EC agreements. A method of invalidation may be 
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when the ECJ declare the policy is invalid, and the domestic court is bound to follow 
the ECJ’s determination (Martens, 1998). In case of non-compliance or absent 
invalidation by the ICJ, the state’s government has the option of paying penalties 
rather than changing its policy (Kalanke V. Bremen, 1997). These concepts have 
ensured the ECJ’s compliance and promoted the legal integration among the EU law. 
   Even though ASEAN has formed as an inter-organization for nearly 50 
years, but it has a little progress in its legal cooperation. Since, ASEAN is consisted of 
10 countries with their different cultures, traditions, languages and religions. It has 
different styles of political systems for example, Westminster-style parliamentary 
systems, democracy elected president, socialism and military government etc. 
Furthermore, the law and legal systems also vary greatly, some are based on the Civil 
law, English common law, Dutch continental law, or Islamic law etc (Chukiert, 2015, 
p. 3). In some ASEAN countries, likes Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia, they are 
controlled under Muslim Shari’ah Courts which exercising jurisdiction over Muslims on 
certain matters. These factors make it hard for all ASEAN members to be bound and 
accepted the same legal systems. As a result, the legal cooperation among ASEAN 
countries is tardy.  
   By contradict with the ASEAN way, ASEAN did not accept the idea of direct 
effect and supremacy like EC did. ASEAN sticks hardly with the norm of the ASEAN 
way. They needed to respect the sovereignty of the member states by not interrupting 
in the internal affairs. Thus, it is important to be careful and limit the power of the 
panels or the Appellate Body by not letting them invalidate the existing law or create 
the new law.  
   ASEAN member states should amend the EDSM Protocol by clearly stating 
the provisions to restrict the power of the panels and Appellate Body. It shall not 
invalidate any provisions of existing law (Chukiert, 2015, p. 13). The amendment 
should cover to the decisions of the panels or the Appellate Body that shall not be 
considered as the precedent for the future disputes. The case should be decided 
case-by-case. There are two dangers that EDSM may interfere to the legal system of 
ASEAN member states. 
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   A. Invalidating existing law 
    To avoid the direct confrontation, the panel or Appellate Body should 
review the domestic law before interpret or made a determination that whether the 
parties to the dispute has violate the ASEAN agreement. The limiting of 
implementation or interpretation of the agreement will eventually invalidate the 
existing law. On the other hand, if the panel or Appellate Body has limited the power 
of domestic law that violates the agreement, it will begin to usurp the lawmaking 
power to the member state (Braid & Horte, 1994). 
   B. Creating the new law 
    In European Community, the principle of direct effect and supremacy 
will automatically bind to the EC members. However, ASEAN did not agree with this 
principle. In order to maintain the power of domestic members’ courts, they refrained 
from using the decision in the previous case as a precedent in the future. Therefore, 
the explicit restrictions and clear legal framework not only encourage the cooperation 
of ASEAN under the context of the ASEAN Way but also they help to bolster the 
confidence of ASEAN member states in using EDSM.  
 
  4.3 Amending the provision of the EDSM  
   A. The short duration of EDSM panel’s timeframe 
    The strict and limit timeframe under EDSM appears to be unachievable. 
It does not appear to be realistic or logical. The whole process of EDSM, from the 
beginning when the parties file a request for consultation until the adoption of the 
report by the Appellate Body, may take around 11 months. By contrast to WTO DSU, 
it takes around 16 months to complete the process. 
    By virtue of Article 8. 2 of the Protocol of EDSM, the panel must 
complete its work and submits report to the SEOM around 60-70 days after the 
establishment of the panel. This short timeframe is impossible for ASEAN to form the 
composition of the panel, two rounds of submissions by the parties (EDSM, Appendix 
II. 2 (4) and (7)), two rounds of meetings (EDSM, Appendix II. 1 (b) and (7)), and interim 
review report (EDSM, Article 8 (3)).  However, the WTO DSU timeframe for the panel 
is around 9 months which start counting after panelists are selected.  
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    As establishing the ASEAN panel, the composition of the panel takes 
up to 30 days. The panel has only 30-40 remaining days to complete the proceedings. 
According to the article 8(4) of EDSM, the limited timeframe makes it impossible to 
invite the experts to the case because it is quite time consuming procedure. As a 
result, it is likely that ASEAN will be unable to follow their compulsory timeframe. 
This could affect to the credibility of the mechanism.  
    Furthermore, by comparing to the Appellate proceedings stipulated in 
article 12.5 of the Protocol EDSM, it gives the longer timeframe within 60-90 days. 
Thus, the timeframe in panel stage is too short and unrealistic.  
    Therefore, it is likely that ASEAN panels will fail to respect the 
compulsory timeframe of EDSM. This is one of the factors which dissuade ASEAN 
member states to utilize the EDSM. 
   B. Coverage of ASEAN DSM Fund in EDSM 
    First, the EDSM has no provision to apportion the expenses of the 
dispute to the parties.  According to the article 17 of EDSM, it mentioned about the 
expense which covered through the process. It includes all expenses arising from the 
panels, the Appellate Body and other administrative costs of the ASEAN Secretariat 
(Vergano, 2009, p. 12). However, it remains unclear about the appropriate guidelines 
or the evaluation method detailed on how panels and the Appellate Body will be 
shared the costs among the parties and third parties. And the expense did not cover 
to legal representation.  
    The second is the vague expense of ASEAN DSM. According to a source 
from ASEAN Secretariat, it has informed that the ASEAN DSM fund has reached 
US$345,000 which is likely to be insufficient to cover all expenses of the panel, 
Appellate Body and the ASEAN Secretariat which counted from the time a party file a 
request for consultation to the time of implementation of the reports. 
    The clear evaluation of expense will encourage the ASEAN member 
states to trust in the process of ASEAN DSM. Besides, it should be compliance in 
accordance with the New York Convention of United Nations. 
 
49  
Assumption University Law Journal                  วารสารนิติศาสตร มหาวทิยาลัยอัสสัมชัญ 
Vol. 7 No. 2 (July - December 2016) ปที่ 7 ฉบับที ่2 (กรกฎาคม – ธันวาคม 2559) 
Article  Natthada Termudomchai 
  4.4 Lacking of human resources and administrative function of ASEAN 
Secretariat  
   ASEAN Secretariat is in charge of various administrative as well as on other 
functions in all fields of ASEAN cooperation such as political-security, economic and 
socio-cultural (The ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint, 2009). Moreover, 
they also need to engage in monitoring the compliance of disputing parties with the 
arbitral awards and mutually settlement agreements. 
   This can be proved by the report from Dr Surin Pitsuwan, ASEAN Secretary-
General, he explained that the ASEAN Secretariat employed 260 personnel, including 
79 staffs openly recruited from member states (K. Shongkittavorn, 2016). They are 
responsible for the general administrative functions under the ASEAN Charter, as well 
as under the 2004 Protocol. In contrast, the WTO employs more than 600 staffs to 
handle only trade cooperation and settlement of disputes (WTO, 2016).  From the 
situation, ASEAN Secretariat is not as effective as it should be due to the lack of human 
resources and the workloads that it needs to handle.  
   On the other hand, Secretariat also played a role as legal advisor, so it 
requires the knowledge of the law of treaties and other substantial international law 
in order to support EDSM panel conducting with the trade disputes. However, the 
ASEAN Secretariat’s Legal Services and Agreements Division employs only five lawyers 
for providing legal advice and opinions on trade disputes and interpreting the Charter 
(Interview with an official of the ASEAN Secretariat, 2014). In contrast, the WTO Legal 
Affairs Division employs seventeen lawyers to provide legal advice to the WTO dispute 
settlement panels, other bodies and members (WTO, 2016). 
   Even though the ASEAN secretariat is responsible for many tasks, but still 
the secretariat has low power to enhance the process. There was a proof from Dr. 
Surin Pitsuwan, the ASEAN Secretary-General, that ASEAN secretariat has been faced 
to the lack of resources and a severe shortage of funds (Surin, 2011, pp. 26 and 34). 
Despite to the responsibilities of the Secretariat, the financial funding for the 
secretariats should be increased. 
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  4.5 Recommendations to ASEAN EDSM 
   After studying ASEAN DSM, I will give some recommendations that can help 
to improve the mechanism. 
   1. To uphold the stability of the mechanism, ASEAN should amend some 
provisions in EDSM in order to make them more predictable, realistic and effective.  
     a. ASEAN should extend the timeframe in the panel stage of ASEAN 
EDSM in order to make the model appropriate, logical and realistic. The longer 
timeframe will help ASEAN to have appropriate time in preparing the documents, 
evidence, or invite the experts to the EDSM panel.  
     b. ASEAN should discuss about the amendment of agreement in the 
section of coverage fund. They should create the clear calculation and to show the 
coverage all over the process. The fees need to be more precise and predictable. 
     c. EDSM Protocol should explicitly stipulate the provisions to restrict 
the power of the panels and Appellate Body in order to not invalidate any provisions 
of existing law or creating the new law. The express restrictions should strengthen the 
cooperation of ASEAN under the context of the ASEAN way. 
     d. The panel or Appellate Body did not have the status as a supreme 
court. ASEAN should bear in mind that the rulings from the previous cases shall not 
be used as the precedent in the next future case. The decision should be made case 
by case.  
     e. To improve the transparency and restrain the political power away 
from the ASEAN DSM, ASEAN should clearly state the requirements that consensus 
can influence to the DSM. 
   2. The function of ASEAN Secretariat should be improved.  From the 
current situation, the secretariats need to handle with tons of works such as the 
general administrative issue, legal advice or legal interpretation in both economic and 
non-economic disputes. The complicated and disorganized tasks of secretary result in 
malfunction of the working process. Employing more legal experts, experienced 
lawyers, and other administrative officers will help secretariats providing better 
service. 
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   3. The funding to ASEAN officials should be in appropriate amount in 
order to convince the high quality of human resources working with ASEAN such as 
legal experts, panelists, arbitrators, or other administrative officials. 
   4. For the better legal cooperation and integration among ASEAN 
members, the government should encourage their legal experts to engage more in 
the international ASEAN seminars, conferences or any other ASEAN workshops in order 
to exchange legal issues, opinions, and support the mutual cooperation among ASEAN 
and other international lawyer. These will improve the quality of ASEAN human 
resources. The cooperation of ASEAN lawyers or legal experts in the international level 
such as WTO or ICJ will help upgrading the quality and knowledge of human resources. 
If ASEAN settle the disputes by using ad hoc arbitration, they can invite the ASEAN 
legal experts who have been involved in the international case or the legal experts 
from the international organization to the panel.  
 
5.  Conclusion  
  ASEAN has foreseen the necessity to develop the consistency and formality of 
ASEAN DSM in order to deal with the economic disputes. Currently, the most 
important of ASEAN DSM instruments are EDSM, which resembled the model of WTO 
DSU, and the PDSM which have a big impact on the interpretation and implementation 
of ASEAN economic agreements. The mechanism is highly formal, legalistic. However, 
the ASEAN DSM has never been utilized by the ASEAN member states. From the case 
study, it showed that ASEAN preferred to choose WTO DSU and ICJ as their dispute 
resolution. The ASEAN way can reflect the impact of the consensus from the Summit 
which seems to hinder and undermine the legal certainty of ASEAN. For an effective 
mechanism, ASEAN should guarantee that the disputes will be resolved in timely 
manner. The decision-making by the consensus takes a long time-consuming process. 
It has a little chance that all of the members will totally agree with the policy in the 
first round of the Summit meeting. Therefore, the disputes will be dragging and 
submitting into the second round of meetings. In case of urgent and severe disputes, 
a lengthy process of negotiation may undermine the regional peace and security of 
ASEAN community. 
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  Moreover, EDSM should explicitly stipulate the authority of the panel and 
Appellate Body. As ASEAN has the norms of respecting the sovereignty of the 
members’ countries and not interfering in the other domestic affairs, they should 
avoid invalidating any provisions of existing law or creating the new law. It means that 
EDSM panels and the Appellate Body should not add or diminish the rights and 
obligations provided in the ASEAN economic agreement; otherwise it will begin to take 
a role of lawmaking power. And they should beware that the result of the previous 
disputes cannot be used as the precedent for the case in the future; the disputes 
shall be decided case by case. The clear procedure of EDSM will encourage the 
implementation of ASEAN DSM. It increases the confidence of the investors and 
progresses cooperation in achieving the economic goals.  The amending of some 
procedures in EDSM will provide a better resolution and avoid the recurrence in the 
future. This helps maintaining a friendly relationship in the long run. The members 
will not waste their time dragging on the conflicts and spending tons of money fighting 
against each other.  
  On the other hand, there are many discussions argued about the contribution 
of ASEAN court or ASEAN arbitration center. The establishment of ASEAN court or 
ASEAN arbitration center needs a huge amount of financial support which would be a 
big burden to the organization. ASEAN should carefully consider the amount of the 
current disputes, if the number of disputes is not that many, it is not necessary to 
spend that high cost for the construction of the court or the arbitration center like EU 
or WTO. Regarding from the interview with Dr. Nattapat Limsiritong, he mentioned 
about the ASEAN awareness to protect their sovereignty. ASEAN will try as best as 
they can to protect and not let anyone interfere in their domestic affairs. So, the plan 
to establish the ASEAN court is hardly to be seen in the near future. 
  Lastly, I hope that this dissertation will be a useful guideline for the 
improvement of mechanism in the future. ASEAN should encourage in bringing out 
ASEAN DSM into concrete actions not just only the paper model or theoretical 
framework. The effective of ASEAN DSM will promote the security and stability of 
ASEAN which will accelerate the economic and legal cooperation in the long term.  
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